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1. Summary 
This rapid review explores the contextual factors that influence donor programme success in the 
OPTs. The success of anti-corruption, transparency and accountability programmes in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) have been severely limited by the lack of checks on 
governing authorities both within the OPTs and from donors. Donor projects aimed at capacity 
building in civil society and advocacy for anti-corruption laws have done little to change the 
entrenched lack of accountability, integrity and transparency in governing structures. 
Since the Oslo accords in 1993, donors have provided money to support the development of a 
Palestinian state including improvements in its governance. Several contextual factors have 
hindered this work, including the stalled process towards statehood, continued Israeli incursions 
and interference in the OPTs, the split between the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) in the 
West Bank and the Hamas-led Gaza Strip since 2006, and the lack of elections since 2006. 
Despite funding for anti-corruption, transparency and accountability initiatives, there has been 
little improvement and authoritarianism has worsened in the territories. Significant portions of 
donor funds are lost to corruption. The PA has signed several anti-corruption laws, but scholars 
agree that the reforms are piecemeal and ineffective. Nepotism and clientelism are identified as 
the leading forms of corruption and governments are not accountable. 
There is little information on Palestinian civil society organisations (CSOs). One prominent 
organisation, AMAN (Coalition for Accountability and Integrity), has partnered with the 
international non-governmental organisation Transparency International to evaluate integrity as 
well as advocate. However, engagement between Western donors and Palestinian non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) has often been limited, particular in Gaza since Hamas’ 
election victory in 2006. Donors have sought to build the capacity of civil society, but such 
measures have been limited by state threats to freedom of speech and a lack of real 
accountability in state institutions. 
The literature surveyed includes academic and grey literature. Much of the academic literature 
addresses the role of aid in relation to the Palestinian governing structures, the Israeli occupation 
and the policies of major donor countries. International donor reports cover a variety of 
programmes and include evaluative statements which point to the positives of individual 
programmes (surveyed in sections 3 and 4). However, broader evaluations and the academic 
literature state that there has been no significant improvement in accountability, transparency 
and anti-corruption because of the overarching political situation and the unwillingness of donors 
to challenge this. The literature is gender blind. 
2. Contextual factors in the OPTs 
Government of the OPTs 
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) has used patronage to secure its power 
since before the 1993 Oslo accords.1 According to Dana (2015, p. 2), ‘patron-clientelism is 
                                                   
1 The Oslo accords marked the beginning of a peace process between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) and the state of Israel. They established the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the governing body in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. They aimed to settle unresolved questions within five years. Following this, international 
donors sought to build the PA’s governing capacity. 
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rooted in the social values of kinship and familial ties, which are in turn shaped by factional 
politics. These social and political ties provide the ruling elite with a strategic tool to control 
constituents and expand the network of supporters by redistributing public resources in order to 
buy political loyalties, which in turn helps the ruling elite to preserve the status quo and maintain 
its dominance of political and economic assets.’ Patrons will excuse or ignore the corruption of 
those who are loyal to them.  
This system of patron-clientelism has been continued by the Oslo accords. The Israeli 
government’s ‘intention in signing the Oslo accords was to create a client state that they could 
continue to control through the rents distributed to the Palestinian Authority (PA) via international 
donors, coupled with a strategy of territorial fragmentation and containment’ (Dana, 2015, p. 3). 
The current institutional set-up does little to check abuses of the PA. The lack of a 
functioning Palestinian Legislative Council since 2007 and the lack of independence in the 
judiciary mean there is little oversight of either PA policies, or protection against corrupt practices 
(AMAN, 2019b, p. 14). The literature agrees that the ‘PA is not accountable to the Palestine 
people in the form of electoral censure due to the absence of regular elections’ and ‘[i]neffective 
or absent political institutions that could provide checks and balances, and the lack of a culture of 
transparency and accountability, compound the problem’ (Kundsen & Tartir, 2017, p. 19). 
The World Bank’s control-of-corruption indicator puts the OPTs as above average for lower 
middle-income countries. Bribery rates in schools (4-6%), hospitals (4-6%) and courts (15%) are 
not seen by Palestinians as the main problem and are not exceptional by international standards. 
However, nepotism and clientelism are much more prevalent than bribery in both the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip (Kukutschka, 2018b, p. 3). The misappropriation of funds by political elites is 
a significant problem and hard to track because of the use of foreign bank accounts to launder 
money (Kukutschka, 2018b, p. 4).  
Corruption is also rooted in business practices. Scholars point to ‘the large-scale public and 
private monopolistic practices in strategic sectors of the Palestinian economy’ and argue that 
‘crony capitalism’ is prevalent within the PA (Dana, 2019). Public sector contacts and decisions 
remain opaque. Some public sector appointments are given by “special contracts” and the 
government has granted concessions for public services without disclosing details of the 
process. The budget is not overseen because of the absence of a functioning Palestinian 
Legislative Council and the 2013 accounts will not be published until 2019 (AMAN, 2019b, p. 7). 
In Gaza, despite gaining a reputation for efficiency before 2007, since coming to power, Hamas 
has put supporters in government jobs and has failed to act transparently regarding the money it 
made from smuggling tunnels to Egypt (Dana, 2015, p. 6).  
In recent years, the PA has taken a number of anti-corruption measures (Dayyeh, 2018, pp. 6–
8): 
 Passed an Anti-Corruption Law in 2010 (amended in 2017); 
 Established an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2010; 
 Launched a National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2015-18); 
 Introduced a computerised placement system for civil service jobs in 2016; 
 Passed the Public Procurement Law in 2016; 
 Passed the Money Laundering Law in 2007 (amended in 2015 and 2016); 
 Joined Interpol in 2017; 
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 Approved the National Policies’ Agenda 2017-2022 ‘Putting Citizens First’, which 
incorporated a number of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and targets, including 
a number of targets from Goal 16, such as enhancing accountability and transparency in 
public institutions, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration of public 
funds, and the ways to achieve justice. 
However, observers also point to the failure to pass legislation such as ‘a witness and 
whistle-blower protection law, the criminalizing of all corruption crimes in accordance with the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), and regulation concerning matters of 
conflict of interest and the revolving door, when officials transfer between the Public Sector and 
the Private Sector’ (AMAN, 2019a, p. 9; Dayyeh, 2018, p. 6). Legislation and political will to 
tackle corruption and improve transparency are lacking. The government has not passed the 
Access to Information Law or the Archive Law (AMAN, 2019b, p. 7).  
The government has also done little to ensure transparency and protect the rights of civil 
society actors. The government frequently fails to publish decisions and, ‘[a]rbitrary arrests 
have increased against political activists, journalists, and bloggers on the grounds of alleged 
violations of publishing rules’ (Dayyeh, 2018, p. 8) 
There have recently been some improvements in public employment practices and within 
the public sector, including: 
 A Strategic Plan for Civil Service to rationalise the wage bill. 
 A plan to involve civil society in appointing the lower ranks of the civil service. 
 Publishing the results of employment exams. 
 Approval of a code of conduct for the security services. 
 Awareness raising activities for this code of conduct in the civil service. 
 The Electricity Sector Regulatory Council was established with a set structure, an annual 
budget and a written stipulation confirming its financial and administrative independence. 
 The effective work of the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau (SAACB) in the 
West Bank. It referred 23 reports of corruption to the Anti-Corruption Commission in 
2018. It received 48 complaints from the Gaza Strip. 
(AMAN, 2019b, pp. 5–6). 
However, at the higher level of government, a report written by AMAN, a civil society anti-
corruption organisation, points to ‘the constant decline in the openness and transparency of the 
government and its institutions and the decline in the level of integrity and transparency in the 
management of public funds’ (AMAN, 2019b, p. 6). The report says that in 2018, 62 officials were 
appointed and promotions made through presidential decree and without competition, and that 
‘the majority’ of appointments and promotions ‘were carried out on bases of nepotism, loyalties 
and power-sharing’ (AMAN, 2019b, p. 7). 
Taken together, the anti-corruption apparatus in the OPTs is only partially effective. For 
instance, 153 cases were looked at by the Anti-Corruption Court between 2010 and 2017, but 
most ‘related to junior employees with simple corruption crimes’ rather than higher-level state 
corruption (Dayyeh, 2018, p. 6). The judiciary is not considered to be fully independent (Dayyeh, 
2018, p. 6). The Anti-Corruption Commission is seen to be ineffective. It heard no cases 
regarding Wasta (favours) or favouritism in 2018. It heard 29 cases, of 482 reports, in 2018 
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(AMAN, 2019b, p. 9). Dayyeh (2018, p. 7) therefore characterises the current measures as 
‘scattered anti-corruption efforts and individual and incomplete initiatives.’ 
Israeli occupation 
Israeli appropriation of donor funds, tax revenues and natural resources constitutes a 
significant drain on public finances. Estimates of the effect of occupation on the Palestinian 
economy range from a loss of one third to three quarters (Kundsen & Tartir, 2017, p. 20). It is 
argued that ‘aid correlates with processes of “de-development” in the West Bank’ (Kundsen & 
Tartir, 2017, p. 20). The confiscation of funds and salaries for political prisoners in Israeli prisons 
and sanctions on employees in Gaza makes the running of institutions difficult (AMAN, 2019b, p. 
14). Israel also ‘offers a safe haven for the corrupt and provides them with protection’ (Dana, 
2015, p. 5).  
According to a recent Norwegian review, ‘recent study estimates that 72 per cent of international 
aid ends up in the Israeli economy, through practices that divert the flows (monopoly on goods 
and services) and subvert (customs union, taxes and levies) the aid’ (Kundsen & Tartir, 2017, p. 
19). Money is also lost by the ‘willful Israeli destruction of infrastructure built with aid money, 
estimated at EUR 65 million during 2001–15’ (Kundsen & Tartir, 2017, p. 20).  
Donor policies 
Scholars point to the negative effect that international aid has on the integrity of 
Palestinian institutions. A Transparency International evaluation argues that ‘the PA’s 
dependence on foreign aid makes it vulnerable to donor pressure to reform’ (Karanàsou, Karoud, 
& Kassis, 2016, p. 19). However, while donors have increasingly emphasised good governance 
in recent decades, there is little evidence that they have challenged the clientelism or security-
focus of the PA. Aid previously aimed to align ‘with the Palestinian Reform and Development 
Plan (PRDP, 2008–10), and the Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP, 2011–13)’. The 
high point of this process was in 2008-10, but since then the lack of progress in peace talks 
combined with the lack of elections in the OPTs has seen progress stall (Kundsen & Tartir, 2017, 
p. 19).  Donors prioritise security and stability over good governance (Turner, 2019, p. 285). 
Donors have avoided addressing the corruption of the PA, the lack of progress in peace talks, or 
the effects of the Israeli occupation. Given that ‘it is difficult to disentangle the effects of 
corruption from those caused by other challenges such as the political, economic and social 
situation in the territories’ (Kukutschka, 2018a), this is seen to be a significant limitation. 
According to Dana (2019, pp. 6-7), ‘donor politics tend to preserve the rentier nature of the PA 
while disregarding its authoritarian character, widespread corruption and repressive security 
practices in exchange for enforcing stability.’ Much of the PA’s budget is funded by donors, and 
supports a large public sector appointed by patronage (Farsakh, 2016, p. 55). The PA meets 
donors’ technical requirements, while continuing to distribute money to its supporters without real 
transparency or accountability (Ibrahim & Beaudet, 2012, p. 482). A growing percentage of the 
PA’s budget is spent on security, but there is evidence that the proportion spent on security is 
downplayed (Tartir & Wildeman, 2016, pp. 23–24). In the period 2008-12, €2 billion of the aid 
sent to the West Bank and Gaza was lost to corruption in the PA (Kundsen & Tartir, 2017, p. 27). 
A report suggests that given the lack of effective laws and independent judiciary, efforts to 
increase reporting of corruption are futile and ‘an institutional and political overhaul, rather than 
limited and fragmented political and legal reforms, is necessary’ (Fatafta, 2018, p. 6). 
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Donors funding the OPTs have done little to adjust their approach or listen to voices from 
civil society. According to Wildeman (2018, p. 124) ‘since 1993 donors have imposed a radically 
transformative and one-size-fits-all model upon the Palestinians, remodelling OPT society from 
the top-down, with basically no accountability to the Palestinians.’ They have not attempted to 
address problems brought about by the Israeli occupation, and have not challenged the PA’s 
corruption (Kundsen & Tartir, 2017, p. 20). Aid to Palestinian NGOs has been selective: 
‘international aid to such organizations has created a wedge between NGOs that have the savvy 
to address a Western audience, and those that have remained more involved in grassroots work 
but lacked funding either because they are not Anglophone or secular enough’ (Farsakh, 2016, 
pp. 57–58). Similarly, according to Springer (2015, p. 8), ‘[g]overnance reform interventions, like 
so many others, continue to emphasise short-term ‘wins’, relying on existing institutions and 
power centres to do so. The complexities of fostering channels of accountability beyond spaces 
for ‘citizen voice’, for instance by supporting political mobilisation, are frequently beyond the 
scope of programmes funded by ODA institutions.’  
The split between the PA and the Hamas government in Gaza from 2006 has led to 
worsening accountability. Since 2006, humanitarian and development actors have practised a 
policy of no-contact with the Hamas government in Gaza.2 This has crippled the government and 
has meant that services are delivered by aid organisations instead. Since PA employees have 
been forbidden from working under Hamas, Hamas has filled vacancies with members and 
affiliates, rather than qualified candidates. Judges are also political appointees, which has ‘led 
the Palestinian Center for Human Rights to reject the legitimacy of Gaza’s judiciary and stop 
defending Gazans in civil courts’ (Qarmout & Beland, 2012, p. 38).  
In Gaza, ‘providing aid while observing a no-contact policy vis-à-vis the Hamas government, 
contravenes key OECD principles for aid effectiveness’ (Kundsen & Tartir, 2017, p. 19). Hamas 
has attempted to force aid agencies to use its own beneficiary list, while the PA has attempted to 
control the flow of aid to Gaza (De Groof, 2009, p. 6). The UNDP’s mandate aims to foster 
democratic governance by working with local institutions and civil society organisations (CSOs). 
This is not possible in Gaza because most CSOs are classified as supporting Hamas. ‘[fo]r 
UNDP, working under the no-contact policy—excluding the Hamas government and its affiliated 
CSOs—while trying to promote democratic governance places it in contradiction to its own 
mandate’ (Qarmout & Beland, 2012, p. 41). 
Many services are provided by aid agencies rather than state institutions, particularly in Gaza. 
According to a report aiming to map donor aid to the OPTs from 2012-2014, since 1993, 
‘Palestinians have also regularly been excluded from the opportunity to make decisions on how 
they are governed or to determine their own socio-economic policies, in spite of local ownership 
being widely acknowledged as the key ingredient to effective aid, and as agreed to by major 
OECD donors in the Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action, and Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Co-operation’ (Tartir & Wildeman, 2016, p. 12). Levels of transparency in 
aid vary between donors (Tartir & Wildeman, 2016, p. 106). 
                                                   
2 In 2006, Hamas won elections in the OPTs. Hamas is classified as a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US and 
the EU and rejects tenets of the Oslo peace process. Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip and Fatah retained 
control of the PA, with control of the West Bank. The Fatah-led PA refuses to co-operate with Hamas and pays its 
civil servants to abstain from work. Aid organisations practise a policy of no-contact with Hamas authorities.  
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3. Palestinian civil society 
A number of Palestinian and donor-led initiatives have sought to increase the capacity of 
CSOs. However, the efforts of CSOs against state corruption are limited because information is 
not transparent, civil society actors are not consulted about government decisions, and there is 
insufficient protection for whistle-blowers (Dayyeh, 2018, p. 8). 
AMAN (Coalition for Accountability and Integrity) 
The 2018 corruption and integrity report by the Palestinian NGO, AMAN (Coalition for 
Accountability and Integrity) describes the positive effect of CSOs in increasing accountability in 
health, education, welfare and social protection.  
The report lists the following initiatives: 
 An accountability session with the Deputy Minister of Economy on ‘Consumer Protection 
Procedures and Measures on Alah-El-Din Commercial Gate’ on 10 March 2018. 
 An accountability session with the Foundation for the Care of Families of Martyrs and the 
Wounded on transparency of management and implementation of the Haj pilgrimage 
grants on 5 June 2018. 
 An accountability session entitled ‘the Palestinian Police strategy 2017-2022’, hosted by 
the Civil Forum to Enhance Good Governance in the Security Sector and attended by the 
police, on 9 May 2018. 
 An accountability session on the land settlement project, attended by the chairman of the 
Land and Water Settlements Commission along with Judge Mousa Shakarneh on 16 
May 2018. 
 An accountability session on social security law, with the chairman of the board for social 
security, on 13 March 2018. 
 A national day of accountability sessions was held on 8 October 2018 across the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, including 23 sessions on education, health, unemployment and 
other issues. 
(AMAN, 2019b, pp. 21–22). 
On 26 November 2018, several CSOs jointly released the Jerusalem Declaration for Combating 
Corruption. It recommended: 
 The consolidation of efforts in combating corruption and waging war on corruption and 
the corrupt, in addition to the national unity and holding presidential and legislative 
elections, constitutes one of the main focal points to the end the occupation and to 
achieving our independent statehood. Furthermore, protecting public funds and 
Palestinian resources from looting by the corrupt is to maintain our political struggle. This 
can only be achieved through strict laws, a firm political will, determination to expose and 
condemn corruption and a vigilant and alert public that follows up and holds the guilty 
accountable 
 The need for collaboration between sectors and parties, as well as the professional 
management of funds. 
 A participatory approach in developing anti-corruption plans and strategies. 
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(AMAN, 2019b, p. 23). 
4. Donor projects 
USAID 
USAID projects between 2008 and 2016 include: 
 ‘CPP (Civic Participation Program’, provides strategic opportunities to civil society 
organizations to adopt and utilize internal democratic management practices to ensure 
transparent decision-making and communication practices that will increase 
accountability of internal governance, quality of performance, and credibility of external 
outreach’ (Farsakh, 2016, pp. 57–58). 
 EPIM (Enhancing Palestinian Independent Media Project), which ‘Aims to develop the 
institutional and professional capacity of independent media and to promote informed 
dialogue between the PA and the Palestinian public / Strengthen a professional media for 
a democratic Palestinian state’ (Farsakh, 2016, pp. 57–58). 
 LDR (Local Democratic Reform–TAWASOL), which ‘Seeks to enhance the capacity of 
the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG); strengthen the capacity of partner Local 
Government Units (LGUs); and expand civic engagement and participation in partner 
municipalities’ (Farsakh, 2016, pp. 57–58). 
 PACE (Palestinian Authority Capacity Enhancement Program), which ‘Provides 
technical and advisory support to targeted PA institutions to upgrade capabilities, 
improve management skills, improve citizen services, and enhance the performance of 
the public sector institutions and skills of civil servants’ (Farsakh, 2016, pp. 57–58).  
 PJEP (Palestinian Justice Enhancement Program), which ‘Aims to strengthen public 
confidence and respect for justice sector institutions and the rule of law in the West Bank 
and Gaza. The program directly addresses the priorities and objectives outlined in the 
PA’s Justice Sector Strategy and its Plan for the Thirteenth Government.’ (Farsakh, 
2016, pp. 57–58). 
 The West Bank and Gaza Local Democratic Reform Program supported the creation 
of 13 Youth Shadow Local Councils (YSLC). The aim was to encourage youth 
participation and give them experience in good governance (Winbourne & Spector, 2013, 
p. 180). 
 The West Bank and Gaza Local Government and Infrastructure Program created 
systems to enhance financial management of local government budgets, and track 
revenue and expenditures (Winbourne & Spector, 2013, p. 180). 
 The Health Sector Reform and Development Project (Palestinian Flagship) in West 
Bank and Gaza (Winbourne & Spector, 2013, p. 54). 
According to a recent article, these have not had the effect of reducing authoritarianism (Farsakh, 
2016, pp. 57–58). 
Danida 
The Danish aid agency, Danida, focused on statebuilding (41% of expenditure) in the period 
2009-2013. It provided local government assistance, work to improve human rights, and to 
improve the capacity of family courts. Its projects were mainly technical and did not address the 
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politics of corruption. An evaluation notes that ‘Denmark could have done more in terms of the 
policy dialogue with the PA, such as addressing issues of accountability and transparency also in 
relation to corruption and nepotism’ (Danida, 2015, p. 14). The evaluation concludes that it 
attempted to improve service delivery, but has done little to foster local democracy, transparency 
or accountability of public administration or social accountability (Danida, 2015, p. 74). It 
recommends that in future, state-building and human rights should be combined and that it 
should seek to gain more leverage and bring up issues of accountability with the PA (Danida, 
2015, p. 16). Reviews for the 2016-2020 programme have not yet been completed. 
Transparency International 
Transparency International (TI) undertook research and advocacy work in partnership with the 
Palestinian anti-corruption organisation, AMAN (Coalition for Accountability and Integrity). An 
evaluation of their work emphasises the positive effects of their advocacy to the government, and 
capacity building in civil society (Karanàsou et al., 2016). 
Part of the work was a National Integrity System (NIS) for 2013, which was disseminated in 2015 
(450 Arabic and 150 English copies, and 238 downloads in both languages) (AMAN, 2014). The 
evaluation suggests that this work (Karanàsou et al., 2016, pp. 13–16): 
 improved understanding of corruption risks through digital media and youth groups; 
 generated significant media coverage; 
 led to new partnerships with local organisations and politicians; 
 improved the lobbying and advocacy skills of local staff and organisations; and 
 Increased the prestige and networking capabilities of local actors through the creation of 
an Arab Advisory Working Group for Transparency. 
It also contributed to policy changes (Karanàsou et al., 2016, pp. 13–16): 
 The PA cabinet has developed further regulations regarding the conduct of civil servants; 
 The PA cabinet has also formed a committee to monitor the institutional arrangements for 
the law on public procurement, in order to start implementing it in 2016; 
 The proposed PA budget was issued according to how the law stipulates that it should be 
issued; and 
 The Anti-Corruption Commission has used the NIS study to draft amendments to the anti-
corruption law. 
TI also notes several positive changes in civil society (Karanàsou et al., 2016, pp. 13–16): 
 WAFA, the official Palestinian news agency and the Al-Hayat Al-Jadida newspaper have 
both established investigative reporting units following training provided to journalists by 
AMAN;  
 The media department of the Al-Aqsa University in Gaza created a curriculum on 
investigative journalism with AMAN’s help;  
 Two universities, one in the West Bank and one in Gaza, developed curricula for training 
of their students in investigative reporting following AMAN training of journalists and 
university students; 
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 Over forty investigative articles were published in the press following AMAN training in 
investigative journalism. 
Aside from the specific outputs mentioned above, AMAN ‘acquired greater prestige’ through 
publishing the NIS and partnering with an international organisation (Karanàsou et al., 2016, p. 
17). Palestinians also benefited from the networking and skills sharing platforms which TI was 
able to facilitate, and the help in fostering expertise in investigative journalism (Karanàsou et al., 
2016, p. 17).  
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